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ABSTRACT—Grooming a child for a sexual act is dangerous behavior 
that should be outlawed. However, state grooming laws, when drafted too 
broadly, run the risk of violating the First Amendment. This Comment 
examines a recent constitutional challenge to a Minnesota electronic 
grooming statute and argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the 
wrong standard of review. The Court failed to apply strict scrutiny and thus 
upheld an overbroad statute in violation of First Amendment doctrine. This 
Comment also suggests a simple revision to bring the Minnesota statute in 
line with the Constitution and offers model legislation for other states 
interested in enacting a sexual grooming statute. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ability of sexual predators to communicate with children online is 
at an all-time high.1 This is largely due to children’s increased access to the 
internet.2 Children and teens today are using the internet for very different 
purposes than they were thirty years ago in the 1990s, contributing to their 
increased vulnerability.3 Instead of chat rooms and instant messaging, 
today’s children and teens utilize social media applications like Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat.4 These modern social media platforms 
permit children to publicize much more personal information, allowing 
predators to easily obtain details about a child’s likes, dislikes, activity and 
behavior.5 Children who spend more time online are also more vulnerable––
 
1 See Chapter Seventeen: The Real Numbers and Increasing Online Dangers, KIDSLIVESAFE, 
http://www.kidslivesafe.com/child-safety/online-predators-and-cyberbullying-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/QE9U-4S8S] (“The number of sexual predators and online sexual offenses has more 
than doubled in the last three years, with more than 82% of online sex crimes originating from social 
networking sites that predators use to gain insight into their victim’s habits and likes.”). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Instagram and Snapchat are Most Popular Social Networks for Teens; Black Teens Are Most 
Active on Social Media, Messaging Apps, ASSOCIATED PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. RES. (Apr. 
2017), http://apnorc.org/projects/Pages/Instagram-and-Snapchat-are-Most-Popular-Social-Networks-
for-Teens.aspx [https://perma.cc/54YK-PZYZ] (reporting American teen use of social media applications 
at 76% for Instagram, 75% for Snapchat, 66% for Facebook, and 47% for Twitter). 
 5 See Lysa Myers, How Do We Protect Kids From Online Predators?, WELIVESECURITY (Nov. 27, 
2013, 5:59 PM), https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/11/27/how-do-we-protect-kids-from-online-
predators [https://perma.cc/8UH9-XA2U] (“[Sixty-five percent] of online sex offenders used the victim’s 
social networking site to gain home and school information about the victim.”); Social Media, Mobile 
Phones and Sexting, INTERNET SAFETY 101, http://internetsafety101.org/Socialmediastats 
[https://perma.cc/X9WJ-J4M2] (reporting that 93% of teen Facebook users share their real names, 92% 
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there is a direct correlation between a teenager’s level of isolation and how 
much time they spend online.6 This isolation is often caused by low self-
esteem and antisocial tendencies, significantly increasing the child’s 
susceptibility to an unwanted sexual advance.7 Nonprofits and child 
protective groups have urged parents to keep a closer eye on their children 
and teens.8 Unfortunately, however, the growing number of online sex 
crimes shows that parents’ efforts to monitor their children’s internet usage 
are insufficient.9 Federal and state governments have responded to the risk 
posed by sexual predators by enacting laws criminalizing the solicitation of 
minors to engage in sexual acts.10 These solicitation laws protect minors by 
criminalizing the invitation to engage in sexual conduct, therefore preventing 
any harm from occurring before the offender makes physical contact with a 
child.11 
In the past decade, various states have begun criminalizing “grooming” 
speech, which is the speech leading up to the solicitation of a sexual act with 
 
share pictures of themselves, 21% share their personal cell phone numbers, and 25% share videos of 
themselves). 
 6 Elana T. Jacobs, Online Sexual Solicitation of Minors: An Analysis of the Average Predator, His 
Victims, What Is Being Done and Can Be Done to Decrease Occurrences of Victimization, 10 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 505, 536 (2012). 
 7 Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Tips For Parents: Setting Physical Boundaries, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED 
CHILDREN (2017), http://www.kidsmartz.org/~/media/KidSmartz/ResourceDocuments/ 
KidSmartz_Setting_Physical_Boundaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SQW-VM2M] (teaching children they 
have the right to say no to adults, even when it makes them uncomfortable, which helps them establish 
protective boundaries); Irene van der Zande, Four Strategies for Protecting Kids from Sexual Predators, 
KIDPOWER (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.kidpower.org/library/article/protecting-kids-from-sexual-
predators [https://perma.cc/CZ8V-CL86] (describing preventative measures adults can take, such as 
being a good listener, practicing safety skills, and putting safety concerns ahead of embarrassment or 
inconvenience); Victim Grooming: Protect Your Child from Sexual Predators, BOYS TOWN, 
http://www.boystown.org/parenting/article/Pages/victim-grooming-protect-your-child-from-sexual-
predators.aspx [https://perma.cc/439C-UQ7G] (discussing how becoming knowledgeable about the 
“grooming process” and being able to recognize signs of grooming can protect a child from sexual 
predators). Furthermore, one in three parents say that they have had concerns or questions about their 
child’s technology use in 2014. Maeve Duggan et al., Concerns about Children, Social Media and 
Technology Use, PEW RES. CTR. (July 16, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/07/16/concerns-
about-children-social-media-and-technology-use/#fn-13873-24 [https://perma.cc/X75K-4X2H]. 
 9 See KIDSLIVESAFE, supra note 1.  
 10 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1982) (examining a statute targeting child 
pornography and finding that the State’s interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors is a 
“government objective of surpassing importance”); see also Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from 
Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 607–08 (2005) (examining the government’s interest in protecting children 
from harmful speech). 
 11 See infra note 12. 
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a minor.12 Grooming occurs when an adult intentionally befriends a minor13 
and establishes an emotional connection in order to lower the minor’s 
inhibitions in preparation for illegal sexual contact.14 Grooming can be done 
online or face-to-face,15 and the process includes various stages.16 When done 
 
 12 Illinois and Arkansas have expressly prohibited grooming via state statute. See 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/11-25 (2012) (“Grooming”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-307 (2013) (“Sexually Grooming a 
Child”). Other states, such as Texas and Oregon, have statutes that effectively prohibit grooming 
behavior. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.021 (West 2015) (“Online Solicitation of a Minor”); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 167.057 (2016) (“Luring a Minor”). Indiana and Georgia prohibit communications related 
to or describing sexual conduct if made with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. See IND. CODE 
§ 35-42-4-13 (2014) (“Inappropriate Communication with a Child”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(e) 
(2017) (“Computer or Electronic Pornography and Child Exploitation Prevention Act of 2007”). 
 13 The jury is the ultimate fact finder when it comes to determining whether the defendant intended 
to establish a sexual relationship or a legal, appropriate one. However, experts and psychologists have 
developed lists of behaviors that suggest that an inappropriate relationship was intended, including: (1) 
giving the child a secret phone or tablet; (2) sudden excessive messaging; (3) buying the child gifts or 
treats; (4) flattering the child by claiming to have the same likes and interests; (5) telling dirty jokes; (6) 
claiming to be “best friends” with the child; and (7) touching or hugging the child in front of trusted adults 
to make the child think the touching is okay. See Kristen Jenson, #MeToo –– 10 Ways Predators Are 
Grooming Kids, PROTECT YOUNG MINDS (Oct. 26, 2017), https://protectyoungminds.org/2017/10/26/10-
ways-predators-grooming-kids/ [https://perma.cc/P3R4-RYA3]. Looking at whether these behaviors 
combine to form a pattern can help a jury decide whether the defendant is guilty of grooming or just 
simply being friendly with a child. 
 14 See Online Grooming, INHOPE, http://www.inhope.org/gns/internet-concerns/overview-of-the-
problem/online-grooming.aspx [https://perma.cc/M8FD-CR7X] (defining the child grooming process as 
“actions deliberately undertaken with the aim of befriending and establishing an emotional connection 
with a child, in order to lower the child’s inhibitions in preparation for sexual activity with the child”). 
To groom a child, a pedophile must have a way of effectively communicating with that child in private. 
Id. Because communication over the internet is perceived as anonymous, children often feel a false sense 
of security, even though the children often do not know to whom they are talking. Id. After gaining online 
access to the child, the predator is often skilled at eliciting as much personal information as possible about 
the minor, such as the minor’s home address, current and past locations, interests, and friends. Id. 
Eventually, the predator is able to undermine the minor’s reluctance to participate in sexual acts by asking 
about the child’s sexual experiences and subsequently showing him or her child pornography. Id. 
 15 See Grooming: What It Is, Signs and How to Protect Children, NSPCC, 
https://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-abuse-and-neglect/grooming/ [https://perma.cc/
6WEA-WHB9] (“Children and young people can be groomed online or face-to-face, by a stranger or by 
someone they know - for example a family member, friend or professional.”); see also Brief of Amicus 
Curiae, Minn. Coal. Against Sexual Assault at 3–5, 14, Minnesota v. Muccio, 881 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2016) (No. A15-1951), 2016 WL 3924135 (describing the grooming process and facts 
suggesting that Muccio attempted to groom her victim at school face-to-face and at home via cell phone 
messages). 
 16 Studies suggest these stages include friendship and relationship-forming, exclusivity/isolation, and 
the sexual stage. See Georgia M. Winters & Elizabeth L. Jeglic, Stages of Sexual Grooming: Recognizing 
Potentially Predatory Behaviors of Child Molesters, 38 DEVIANT BEHAV. 724, 725–27 (2017). Early 
stages of grooming speech may “appear to be innocent in nature and typical of adult child interactions” 
when viewed in isolation; however, when coupled with coercion, manipulation and the introduction or 
constant reference to sexual themes, the intent to engage in a serious offense against a child is more 
apparent. Id. at 725; see also Grooming Dynamic, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
http://victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/grooming-dynamic-of-csa 
[https://perma.cc/78GK-YWU8] (“The perpetrator may observe the child and assesses his/her 
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successfully, grooming a child increases the likelihood of engaging the child 
in a sexual act because the child is more likely to trust the adult.17 Grooming 
also often causes the child to not report the sexual contact to other authority 
figures, which allows predators to walk away from criminal conduct without 
any consequences.18 For these reasons, grooming speech is especially 
dangerous. However, while some states have enacted grooming statutes, 
many are poorly written, and most states have no grooming statutes at all.19 
The need for grooming laws that protect against child predators is 
imperative,20 but the modern-day use of the First Amendment to fight 
regulations on speech is also strong.21 Recently, the First Amendment’s free 
speech clause has been successfully used to fight against laws in areas that 
seem only tangentially related to speech, including election spending by 
corporations,22 the baking of cakes by bakers,23 and even unions’ extraction 
of compulsory agency fees from nonmembers.24 Because the First 
Amendment defense has become so robust, courts have complete authority 
 
vulnerabilities to learn how best to approach and interact with the child. Perpetrators may offer the victims 
special attention, understanding and a sympathetic ear, and then engage the child in ways that eventually 
gain their friendship and trust (they may play games with victims or give them rides, provide them with 
gifts and/or special treats).”). 
 17 See Gregory M. Weber, Grooming Children for Sexual Molestation, ZERO, 
http://www.vachss.com/guest_dispatches/grooming.html [https://perma.cc/7H39-AK6J] (“The forging 
of an emotional bond through grooming leads to physical contact. Predators use the grooming process to 
break down a child’s defenses and increase the child’s acceptance of touch. The first physical contact 
between predator and victim is often nonsexual touching designed to identify limits: an ‘accidental’ touch, 
an arm around the shoulder, a brushing of hair. Nonsexual touching desensitizes the child. It breaks down 
inhibitions and leads to more overt sexual touching—the predator’s ultimate goal.”). 
 18 See INT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE GROOMING OF CHILDREN FOR 
SEXUAL PURPOSES: MODEL LEGISLATION & GLOBAL REVIEW 10 (2017) (“Through the grooming 
process, an offender seeks to gain the child’s compliance to maintain secrecy, and to avoid detection and 
punishment.”). Once the predator gains the emotional trust of the minor, the minor is prevented from 
seeking out the protection of their parents, teachers, and other trusted adults. See Online Grooming, supra 
note 1414. 
 19 See statutes cited supra note 12. 
 20 See supra notes 1–6. 
 21 See infra note 51. 
 22 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (finding that the free 
speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from limiting spending for 
communication by corporations). 
 23 See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) 
(finding that the free speech clause of the First Amendment requires civil rights commissions to neutrally 
consider charges of discrimination when a business owner refuses to provide creative services, such as a 
wedding cake for a same-sex marriage). 
 24 See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) 
(finding that the free speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits labor unions from collecting fees 
from nonunion members). 
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to strike down newly enacted grooming laws unless such laws are written to 
withstand a First Amendment challenge.25 
This Comment argues that states should criminalize grooming speech, 
but only if the state statutes are carefully drafted to prevent their overbreadth. 
In doing so, this Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides 
background information regarding the current state of First Amendment 
doctrine. Part II discusses a recent case, Minnesota v. Muccio,26 in which the 
Minnesota Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of an electronic 
grooming statute.27 In Part III, this Comment highlights some of the 
challenges faced by the Minnesota legislature as a result of a poorly drafted 
grooming law and provides guidance in the form of model legislation for 
state legislatures to consider when drafting future laws. Part III also provides 
a legal analysis to support the criminalization of grooming speech. This 
Comment argues that grooming speech should be classified as an extension 
of criminal solicitation and considered unprotected, proscribable speech in 
the context of the First Amendment. 
I. A PRIMER ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment protects speech against government regulation.28 
However, there are three distinct ways that a statute regulating speech could 
fail a First Amendment challenge: first, by falling into one of three categories 
of unprotected speech; second, by violating the “overbreadth doctrine”; or 
third, by failing strict scrutiny analysis as content-based discrimination. This 
Part discusses each one of these in turn. 
First, there are three types of speech that are unprotected and may be 
regulated by either state or federal government: (1) speech communicated to 
“induce or commence illegal activities”;29 (2) obscene speech;30 and (3) child 
 
 25 See infra Section III.B (referencing statutes in Oregon and Texas that were struck down). 
 26 Minnesota v. Muccio (Muccio II), 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328 
(2017). 
 27 Id. at 919. 
 28 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). 
 29 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008) (holding that “offers to engage in 
illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection,” and therefore speech 
that is “intended to induce or commence illegal activities” such as conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation 
is not protected and has no constitutional value). 
 30 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing a three-part test for assessing whether 
material is obscene and therefore unprotected: “(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value”) (internal citation omitted). 
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pornography.31 The first unprotected category, “speech integral to criminal 
conduct,” is relevant in the child predator context because when a predator 
solicits a sexual act from a child, he is communicating in order to commence 
an illegal activity—the sexual conduct. This allows legislatures to 
criminalize the sexual solicitation of a minor before any act occurs.32 Critics 
of solicitation laws argue that the government should not have the ability to 
regulate speech that merely suggests a criminal act might happen at a future 
point in time.33 In United States v. Williams,34 the U.S. Supreme Court found 
an “important distinction between a proposal to engage in illegal activity and 
the abstract advocacy of illegality.”35 Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court ruled in State v. Washington-Davis36 that a statute’s regulation of 
solicitation speech survives a First Amendment challenge if that statute 
“focus[es] on speech directly related to criminal behavior.”37 If the speech 
regulated is not “focused,” then it does not fall into the unprotected category 
of speech, and a court may strike the law down. 
Second, a statute can fail a First Amendment challenge under the 
“substantial overbreadth doctrine,”38 which the Court developed to address 
facial challenges to the First Amendment.39 The goal of the overbreadth 
 
 31 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758, 764 (1982) (adding child pornography as an additional 
category of speech excluded from First Amendment protection and finding that child pornography causes 
substantial harm to children and therefore has no value). 
 32 Because a predator is effectively communicating in order to commence an illegal activity when he 
solicits a sexual act from a child, the “speech integral to criminal conduct” category allows legislatures 
to criminalize the sexual solicitation of a minor before any such act occurs. See Eugene Volokh, The 
“Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1030 (2016) (explaining 
that sexual solicitation of a minor laws are akin to statutes that criminalize constitutionally unprotected 
attempt of a crime). 
 33 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The government may not prohibit 
speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefinite future 
time.’”). 
 34 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
 35 Id. at 298–99. 
 36 881 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016). 
 37 Id. at 538. 
 38 See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255 (“The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from 
banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the 
process.”); see also Minnesota v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 1998) (“A statute is overbroad 
on its face if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited 
without offending constitutional rights.”). 
 39 There are two categories of First Amendment challenges: “as-applied” and “facial” challenges. See 
Doug Linder, The Doctrines of Substantial Overbreadth and Vagueness, EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (2019), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/overbreadth.html [https://perma.cc/
T5DB-ETWY] (explaining the doctrine of substantial overbreadth as having two categories of challenges: 
“as applied” and “facial”). An as-applied challenge is typically described as one where the statute, “even 
though generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the plaintiff’s 
particular circumstances.” Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & 
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doctrine is to ensure that the government does not enact a law that 
inadvertently bans a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
speech.40 The doctrine acknowledges that most laws that regulate speech will 
inevitably reach some speech that is protected under the First Amendment, 
and thus, in addition to leaving legislatures powerless, it would be 
unreasonable to strike down every law that has even one potentially 
impermissible application to protected speech.41 In order to invalidate a law 
under the overbreadth doctrine, therefore, “the overbreadth of a statute must 
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep.”42 
Finally, if a statute restricts speech that concerns an entire topic, and if 
there is hostility toward that topic, then the statute discriminates based on 
content.43 Content-based discrimination must be subjected to a “least 
restrictive means” test, also known as strict scrutiny.44 Under a strict scrutiny 
analysis, content-based statutes are presumed unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment because they allow the government to distinguish between 
 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 657 (2010) (quoting Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 
518 n.16 (Tex. 1995)). This is in contrast to a facial challenge, which is described as one where “no 
application of the statute could be constitutional.” Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). If a 
court finds that a statute is facially unconstitutional, the entire statute is invalidated. See Kreit, supra at 
657. 
 40 See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255 (2002); Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 419. 
 41 See Linder, supra note 39. 
 42 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
 43 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 431 (1996) (referring to “hostility toward ideas as such”); 
see also Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94–96 (1972) (first establishing the importance 
of the content-based distinction). In Mosley, a postman challenged a Chicago ordinance that banned 
picketing outside schools except for “peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.” Id. at 
93. The postman had previously been picketing for months outside schools that he believed were engaging 
in racial discrimination. Id. The Court found that the ordinance distinguished between content and 
allowed those picketers with messages the city liked to picket, while others were prohibited. Id. at 94; see 
also id. at 95 (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
 44 Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may, however, 
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it 
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”). Strict scrutiny is often seen as 
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term Foreword: In Search 
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
8, 17 (1972). However, the content-discrimination standard is still a vital tool in First Amendment 
analysis. See e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“On a 
theoretical level, it reflects important insights into the meaning of the free speech principle—for instance, 
that content-based speech restrictions are especially likely to be improper attempts to value some forms 
of speech over others, or are particularly susceptible to being used by the government to distort public 
debate. On a practical level, it has in application generally led to seemingly sensible results. And, perhaps 
most importantly, no better alternative has yet come to light.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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favored and disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed.45 The 
presumption of unconstitutionality is rebuttable only by showing the statute 
is narrowly tailored to serve a “compelling state interest.”46 A statute is 
narrowly tailored if it employs the least restrictive means to achieve the 
government’s compelling interest.47 The government must satisfy this strict 
scrutiny test in order to enact a statute that lawfully discriminates based on 
the ideas or content of the speech.48 
The U.S. Supreme Court routinely strikes down content-based 
restrictions on speech on the narrow tailoring or “least restrictive means” 
prong of strict scrutiny.49 According to the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, “the purpose of the [least restrictive means] test is to ensure that 
speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is 
important to ensure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.”50 
The above-mentioned three types of First Amendment challenges have 
been recently proven successful in a number of different areas and 
subjects51––sexual grooming of a minor being one of them. The next Part 
 
 45 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (striking down a conviction of a protestor 
that burned an American flag at the Republican National Convention). As Justice William Brennan wrote, 
“[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 
Id. at 414. 
 46 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790, 803–05 (2011) (striking down a 2005 
California law banning the sale of certain violent video games to children without parental supervision, 
finding that video games are protected speech and that the law was not narrowly tailored to the limited 
purpose of preventing actual harm to a child); see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 
529 U.S. 803, 813–14, 827 (2000) (invalidating Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that 
restricted cable channels communicating sexually explicit content to late-night hours, finding that, despite 
the Government’s compelling interest, it was a content-based restriction that failed strict scrutiny). 
 47 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (“[A] court assumes that certain protected speech 
may be regulated, and then asks what is the least restrictive alternative that can be used to achieve that 
goal.”). 
 48 See Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 813 (“If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it 
must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”). 
 49 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2421–23 (1996) (describing instances where the Court has struck down laws 
based on the least restrictive means and narrow tailoring requirements). In United States v. Stevens, the 
Supreme Court struck down Title 18, Section 48 of the U.S. Code, which criminalized the creation, sale, 
or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of commercial gain. 559 U.S. 460, 
464–65, 468 (2010). Because the law regulated communication based on content, the Court held that it 
was presumptively invalid and found that the Government failed to meet its burden of rebutting that 
presumption. Id. at 468, 481–82. 
 50 ACLU, 542 U.S. at 666. 
 51 See, e.g., David Orentlicher, The FDA’s Graphic Tobacco Warnings and the First Amendment, 
389 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 204, 204–06 (2013) (tobacco industry successfully arguing that on-package 
cancer warnings violated the First Amendment); Sam Gustin, How ExxonMobil and Airbnb Are Using 
the First Amendment to Fight Regulation, MOTHERBOARD (July 1, 2016, 9:30 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/nz73gz/how-exxonmobil-and-airbnb-are-using-the-first-
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describes a recent challenge to a Minnesota grooming law and highlights the 
various arguments that were raised both in support of and against the law 
under the First Amendment. 
II. MINNESOTA V. MUCCIO 
In November 2014, a father found inappropriate pictures on his fifteen-
year-old son’s iPad.52 The pictures showed a close-up of a female’s behind 
in a thong, a close-up of a female’s genitals, and a female naked from the 
neck to the waist.53 Krista Ann Muccio, a woman who worked at his son’s 
school cafeteria, sent pictures to the boy through Instagram.54 The father 
reported the photos to law enforcement and a search warrant subsequently 
revealed that Muccio and the child engaged in sexually explicit 
conversations and exchanged sexually explicit photographs.55 The State 
charged Muccio with two offenses: one count of felony communication with 
a minor describing sexual conduct,56 and one count of felony possession of 
pornographic work involving minors.57 The electronic felony 
 
amendment-to-fight-regulation [https://perma.cc/H8NG-Z64P] (noting that corporations have argued that 
government regulation and fraud investigation violate their right to free expression); Sam Gustin, 
Landmark Verizon ‘Net Neutrality’ Case Tests Open Internet Rules, TIME (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://business.time.com/2013/09/09/landmark-verizon-net-neutrality-case-tests-open-internet-rules 
[https://perma.cc/F5ZC-4D5N] (broadband industry challenging rules protecting net neutrality, claiming 
a First Amendment right to control their networks); Eric Newcomer, Airbnb Sues Hometown San 
Francisco to Block Rental Rules, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2016, 9:59 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-27/airbnb-is-suing-hometeown-san-francisco-to-
block-rental-rules [https://perma.cc/65VM-MAHQ] (Airbnb challenging San Francisco’s law requiring 
renters to register with the city as a violation of their free speech rights). 
 52 Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d 914, 918–19 (Minn. 2017). 
 53 Id. at 918. 
 54 Id. 
 55 State v. Muccio (Muccio I), 881 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) review granted (Aug. 23, 
2016), rev’d, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328 (2017). 
 56 Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 919. The statute Muccio was charged under states: 
A person 18 years of age or older who uses the Internet, a computer, computer program, 
computer network, computer system, an electronic communications system, or a 
telecommunications, wire, or radio communications system, or other electronic device capable 
of electronic data storage or transmission to commit any of the following acts, with the intent 
to arouse the sexual desire of any person, is guilty of a felony . . . 
MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009) (emphasis added). The specific section under which she was 
charged prohibits “engaging in communication with a child or someone the person reasonably 
believes is a child, relating to or describing sexual conduct . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 609.352 
subd. 2a(2) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 57 Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 919. This was allegedly in violation of Minnesota Statute § 617.247 
subd. 4(a). Id. 
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communication statute aims to prohibit grooming speech, and as a result, the 
term “grooming statute” will be used when referring to this law.58 
A. In the Lower Courts 
The district court held that the grooming statute59 was unconstitutional, 
finding that it was facially overbroad and thus a violation of the First 
Amendment.60 The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 
grooming statute violated the First Amendment because it criminalized too 
much protected speech.61 The appeals court further found that the statute 
triggered strict scrutiny.62 
In reaching its decision, the appeals court first assessed whether the 
prohibited grooming speech fell into one of three unprotected categories: 
speech integral to criminal conduct, obscene speech, or child pornography.63 
First, the court found that criminalization of the speech violated the First 
Amendment because the statute criminalized speech not directly linked to a 
criminal sexual act.64 The court explained that communication of explicit 
material with an intent to arouse is one step removed from solicitation, and 
thus even further removed from a future criminal act.65 As a result, the State 
had shown “no more than a remote connection between speech that might 
encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse.”66 
Second, the court determined that the obscenity exception was 
inapplicable, finding that the statute criminalized speech not just limited to 
obscene speech under United States v. Miller.67 The court disagreed with the 
State’s argument that the statute’s “intent to arouse the sexual desire of any 
person” requirement, combined with the requirement that the 
communication is with a child, satisfied the Miller test.68 According to the 
court, those elements did not limit the statute’s reach to communication that 
 
 58 See MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009). The statute prohibits an adult from engaging in 
communication with a child if the communication relates to sexual conduct and is communicated with an 
intent to arouse sexual desire. This includes grooming speech, which is the speech leading up to 
solicitation of a sexual act. 
 59 MINN. STAT. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) (2009). 
 60 Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d at 153. 
 61 Id. See discussion on overbreadth supra notes 38–39. 
 62 Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d at 160. 
 63 Id. at 155–57. 
 64 Id. at 155–56. The State admitted that the statute reached speech prior to solicitation, one step 
removed from criminal conduct. Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 156 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002)). 
 67 Id. at 156–57 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), which established a three-part 
test for assessing whether material is obscene). 
 68 Id. at 157. 
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“appeal[s] to the prurient interest” nor did it “exclude from the statute’s 
ambit speech which has social value.”69 
Third, the court determined that the child pornography unprotected-
speech category was inapplicable.70 While the State argued that the statute 
could be analogized to child pornography statutes because the speech caused 
harm to minors, the court found that children need not be depicted under the 
Minnesota statute; there only needs to be a “communication . . . relating to 
or describing sexual conduct.”71 As a result, the policy justification behind 
the criminalization of child pornography was inapplicable because children 
do not even need to be present or involved in the speech prohibited by the 
statute.72 
Next, in assessing whether the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, 
the court found that the statute’s intent requirement—which was satisfied if 
the adult had “the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person”—was far 
too broad.73 One consequence of this broad language was that 
communication that occurred between two adults, and without intent to 
affect a child, may have fallen within the statute’s ambit because the 
prohibited speech only needed to be “relating to or describing sexual 
conduct.”74 Moreover, because the statute did not define “engaging,”75 the 
court found that it was “unclear whether a one-way communication would 
be sufficient.”76 
Finally, the court determined that the statute was a content-based 
regulation and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny.77 The court first found 
the State’s interest compelling, because preventing adults from engaging in 
illegal sexual activity with children was a persuasive and substantial 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a(2) (2009)) (emphasis added). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 158 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a(2) (2009)). 
 74 Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a(2) (2009)). The court determined that this broad 
scope included many topics commonly found in pop culture related to sex in movies, books, and video 
games. Id. 
 75 See supra note 56 for the text of the statute. 
 76 Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d at 158. For example, under the statute, if an adult published material on 
Facebook with an intent to arouse “any person” and a child read and commented on the post, then the 
adult would have “engaged in communication” with “an intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person.” 
Id. Based on this construction of the statute, the court found several colorful examples to illustrate the 
statute’s overbreadth, including a music video producer, film producer, and writer of young-adult fiction. 
Id. The fact that these acts would be criminalized under the statute led the court to find that it was 
overbroad. Id. 
 77 Id. at 160. 
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governmental interest.78 In determining whether the statute was narrowly 
tailored, however, the court found that the statute was not the least restrictive 
means to ensure children are protected from illegal sexual conduct.79 While 
the statute prohibited speech communicated with an intent to arouse an 
individual’s sexual desires, that speech was not necessarily communicated 
with any intent to engage a child in a sexual act.80 Because the statute was 
not narrowly tailored, therefore, the statute violated the First Amendment.81 
The State, unhappy with the court’s decision, appealed the case to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court. 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower court and 
ruled that while the statute did apply to some protected speech, it was not 
overbroad, and the facial challenge thus failed.82 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court first interpreted the plain language of the statute in order to determine 
whether the speech was integral to criminal conduct and therefore 
unprotected. The court then applied the Miller test to determine whether the 
speech was obscene. 
The court first interpreted the statute’s plain language by addressing 
three disputed phrases within the statute: (1) “engaging in communication 
with a child”; (2) “with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person”; 
and (3) “relating to or describing sexual conduct.”83 The court interpreted the 
first phrase—“engaging in communication with a child”—to mean “the adult 
must take some affirmative act to specifically select or designate the child as 
a recipient of the transmission,”84 and therefore, the statute did not prohibit 
non-targeted mass electronic communications, such as social media posts 
that a child happened to view.85 The court found that the second phrase—
“with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person”—included anyone, 
not just the two individuals involved in the communication.86 Lastly, in 
 
 78 Id. (“We agree, and the parties do not dispute, that the state has a compelling interest in prohibiting 
this conduct. ‘The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral 
instincts of a decent people.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002)); see 
also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (“The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of 
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”). 
 79 Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d at 160. 
 80 Id. at 158–60. 
 81 Id. at 160. 
 82 Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328 (2017). 
 83 Id. at 920–22 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009)). 
 84 Id. at 921. 
 85 Id. at 920–21. 
 86 Id. at 921–22. 
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analyzing the third phrase—“relating to or describing sexual conduct”—the 
court found that the prohibited communication could be related to anyone; it 
did not need to describe or relate to sexual conduct involving either the child 
or the adult.87 In sum, the court construed the statute’s plain language to mean 
that it “prohibit[ed] an adult from participating in the electronic transmission 
of information relating to or describing the sexual conduct of any person, if 
the communication was directed at a child, and the adult sending the 
communication acted with the specific intent to arouse the sexual desire of 
any person.”88 
Next, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that most of the speech 
falling within the ambit of the statute would be unprotected speech either 
because it was integral to criminal conduct or was obscene under Miller.89 
Similarly to the lower court, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that, “when 
grooming is done for the purpose of later using the child in sexual conduct, 
it resembles solicitation of the child, and . . . falls outside First Amendment 
protections.”90 The court decided that most of the speech prohibited by the 
statute was integral to criminal conduct, and thus unprotected speech.91 
Lastly, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied Miller and concluded that 
much of the criminalized speech would often be obscene and therefore 
unprotected.92 Because the statute proscribed communication directed at a 
child with the intent to arouse sexual desire, the court found that the speech 
would most likely be “designed by the adult to arouse the child’s sexual 
desire for the adult, or the adult’s sexual desire for the child.”93 Sexually 
explicit speech that is designed to cause sexual arousal is patently offensive 
when an adult directs the speech at a child.94 As a result, the court found that 
most communications falling within the statute met all three prongs in the 
Miller test.95 The court acknowledged that there would be some speech that 
was protected speech, specifically speech that was non-obscene and did not 
fall within another category of unprotected speech, such as speech integral 
 
 87 Id. at 922. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 926–27. 
 90 Id. at 924. The court analogized to the case of United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). Id. 
at 923–24. In Williams, the Supreme Court found that there is no First Amendment protection for offers 
to engage in illegal transactions. 553 U.S. at 298–99. The Court in Williams also found that a federal 
statute prohibiting the “pandering” of child pornography, which included offering or requesting to 
transfer, sell, deliver, or trade the pornographic items, did not violate the First Amendment, even if the 
person charged with “pandering” did not in fact possess child pornography to trade. Id. at 298–99, 300. 
 91 Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 924–25. 
 92 Id. at 925–27. 
 93 Id. at 925–26. 
 94 Id. at 926. 
 95 Id. at 926–27. 
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to criminal conduct or child pornography.96 However, “the vast majority of 
the statute’s applications” were constitutional restrictions on speech, and to 
the extent protected speech was shown to fall within the statute, the court 
held that challenges may go forward on an as-applied basis.97 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari for this case in 2017,98 and in 
March of 2018, Krista Ann Muccio pled guilty to one count of felony 
communication with a minor describing sexual conduct.99 Muccio will face 
time in prison for this conviction and the Minnesota courts have decided that 
she was guilty. However, the question remains: Is the statute100 a violation of 
the First Amendment? Was the Minnesota Supreme Court incorrect in 
upholding a law that is content-based, overbroad, and has the potential to 
chill protected free speech? And is there a simple way to fix the current law 
in place? 
III. ANALYSIS 
The next Part will discuss the significance of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s ruling and will recommend new language for states interested in 
passing grooming legislation. It will also argue that grooming speech should, 
legally, be considered akin to solicitation speech, which provides a 
constitutional rationale for upholding the rewritten statute. 
A. The Errors and Unintended Consequences of Minnesota v. Muccio 
This Section addresses the following three reasons why the statute 
under which Muccio was charged should have been struck down as 
unconstitutional: first, the statute is content-based and, as such, should have 
been subject to strict scrutiny analysis; second, the court failed to apply the 
“least restrictive means” test; and finally, the statute as written is actually a 
regulation on the freedom of thought, and should therefore have been struck 
down and rewritten. 
First, the law proscribes speech “relat[ed] to or describing sexual 
conduct,”101 which makes the statute a content-based restriction.102 The law 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 927, 928–29. 
 98 Muccio v. Minnesota, 138 S. Ct. 328, 329 (2017). 
 99 See Nick Ferraro, Lunch Lady Who Argued Sexting With a 15-Year-Old Was Free Speech Pleads 
Guilty, PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 8, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2018/03/08/lunch-lady-
who-argued-sexting-with-a-15-year-old-was-free-speech-pleads-guilty [https://perma.cc/Z6KP-7L9F]. 
 100 MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009). 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) review granted (Aug. 23, 2016), rev’d, 
890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328 (2017); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–12 (2000) (stating that the essence of a content-based regulation is that “[i]t 
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is content-based because: (1) the law indicates that speech related to sexual 
conduct is disfavored by the Minnesota legislature, and (2) the law restricts 
expression because of a message or idea communicated. Communication 
“relat[ed] to or describing sexual conduct” includes a wide array of 
constitutionally protected literary, artistic, and musical work. For example, 
the law would prohibit sharing songs online, such as Beyoncé’s Drunk in 
Love103 and Katy Perry’s I Kissed A Girl.104 It encompasses middle school 
textbooks related to sexual education and medical textbooks depicting sexual 
organs, if they are accessed electronically. It includes content found in hit 
television shows like 13 Reasons Why,105 Girls,106 The Office,107 and Stranger 
Things.108 Even books like The Scarlet Letter,109 if accessed electronically, 
would be included in this broad definition. Because of this, it is difficult to 
argue that the statute is not a content-based restriction. 
Content-based restrictions are due strict scrutiny, which requires a 
compelling interest on the part of the state. The compelling interest of the 
Minnesota legislature is to prevent illegal sexual conduct between adults and 
children.110 Neither party disputed that the state has a compelling interest in 
prohibiting this conduct,111 and preventing the sexual abuse of children is a 
legitimate goal that the statute aims to prohibit.112 However, the legislature’s 
 
‘focuses only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners’”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 103 BEYONCÉ, DRUNK IN LOVE (Parkwood Entertainment, Columbia Records 2013) (“I’ve been 
drinking, I’ve been drinking / I get filthy when that liquor get into me / I’ve been thinking, I’ve been 
thinking / Why can’t I keep my fingers off it, baby?”) (lyrics available at https://genius.com/Beyonce-
drunk-in-love-lyrics [https://perma.cc/5VUZ-CKQU]). 
 104 KATY PERRY, I KISSED A GIRL (Capitol Records 2008) (“I kissed a girl and I liked it / The taste 
of her cherry chapstick / I kissed a girl just to try it / I hope my boyfriend don’t mind it”) (lyrics available 
at https://www.lyricsmode.com/lyrics/k/katy_perry/i_kissed_a_girl.html [https://perma.cc/Q2X4-
NCZT]). 
 105 13 Reasons Why: The Second Polaroid (July Moon Productions, Kicked to the Curb Productions, 
Anonymous Content, Paramount Television 2018) (depicting a sexual act and discussing consent and 
rape culture). 
 106 Girls: Pilot (Apatow Productions, I Am Jenni Konner Productions, HBO Entertainment 2012) 
(portraying sexual intercourse and other sexual acts). 
 107 The Office: Sexual Harassment (Deedle-Dee Productions, Reveille Productions, NBC Universal 
Television Studios 2005) (discussing sexual harassment policies at work). 
 108 Stranger Things: Chapter Nine: The Gate (21 Laps Entertainment, Monkey Massacre 2016) 
(containing a sexualized kiss between two teenagers). 
 109 See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850) (concerning a woman who 
conceives a daughter through a sexual affair). 
 110 Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d 914, 928 (Minn. 2017) (“The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious 
crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of decent people.”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002)). 
 111 Id. 
 112 See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755–56 (1996) 
(upholding a federal law permitting cable system operators to ban “indecent” or “patently offensive” 
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goal of preventing the engagement of a child in a criminal sexual act is not 
necessarily achieved by what the statute proscribes. As written, the statute 
criminalizes speech made “with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any 
person.”113 The statute does not criminalize speech made with the intent to 
engage a child in sexual conduct. The Minnesota Supreme Court thus erred, 
since it seemed to utilize the “intent to arouse” standard as a proxy for the 
“intent to engage in sexual conduct with a child.” Those two intentions are 
very different, however.114 Speech communicated with the “intent to arouse” 
does not necessarily need to be made with any criminal intent to engage a 
child in sexual conduct.115 
The Minnesota Supreme Court also erred by failing to apply the “least 
restrictive means” test.116 If the goal is to criminalize speech before it turns 
into criminal conduct, the least restrictive means available would be to 
criminalize speech that was communicated only with the intent to engage in 
a criminal sexual act with a minor. Here, however, the speech criminalized 
under the statute must only be made “with the intent to arouse the sexual 
desire of any person.”117 Thus, the statute criminalizes more speech than 
necessary—specifically, speech made with an intent to arouse oneself, but 
without any intent to engage a child in sexual conduct. 
 
speech on leased access channels, since protecting children from such speech is a compelling state 
interest). 
 113 MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009) (emphasis added). 
 114 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis begins with a discussion of why speech that is “integral 
to criminal conduct” is unprotected speech. Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 923. Speech is integral to criminal 
conduct, and thus unprotected, when it “is intended to induce or commence illegal activities, [such as] 
conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 
(2008)). The court states that a defendant who engages in sexual communications with a child and has an 
“intent to arouse” is usually involved in the “grooming process,” and “when grooming is done for the 
purpose of later using the child in sexual conduct,” it is unprotected. Id. at 924. Here, the court construed 
“intent to arouse” to mean “intent to use the child in sexual conduct”; however, this conflates two different 
ideas. The “intent to arouse” means stimulation of oneself or of a child, while the “intent to use the child 
in sexual conduct” means actually engaging the child for the purpose of engaging them in a sexual act.  
 115 The certiorari petition also highlighted this issue. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19–20, 
Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d 914 (No. 17-209), 2017 WL 3405493 (“A text message from an older sister to 
her younger sister that, ‘your boyfriend is really cute—you should totally sleep with him,’ relates to sexual 
conduct and is intended to arouse the sexual desire of the younger sister for her boyfriend. Indeed, even 
a message from a youth minister that says, ‘in marital sex, spouses participate in the very love of God,’ 
may be intended to arouse the sexual desires of young teens toward their future spouses while extolling 
the virtues of abstinence until marriage. And an e-mail from a counselor to a teen questioning sexual 
orientation could also fall within subdivision 2a(2)’s scope if it encourages the teen to acknowledge and 
accept his or her sexual desires.”). 
 116 Instead, the court used an overbreadth test to assess whether the statute was substantially 
overbroad and found that it was not. Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 929. 
 117 MINN. STAT. § 609.352, subd. 2a (2009) (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court overlooked that this statute 
implicates the freedom of thought. The statute’s specific-intent requirement 
of “intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person” criminalizes sexual 
thoughts that may have nothing to do with harming a child.118 The 
Constitution protects thoughts just like it protects speech,119 and the 
government may not “constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability 
of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”120 For decades, judges and 
scholars have stressed that the First Amendment is meant to protect against 
the government controlling our thoughts and right to think freely.121 The right 
to think is crucial to freedom, and speech must be protected from the 
government because “speech is the beginning of thought.”122 An individual’s 
 
 118 One might argue that narrowing the statute to only include “an intent to engage in a criminal 
sexual act with a child” would not protect against adults merely trying to trigger the sexual arousal of a 
child. The statute as written in Part III.B does not cover this behavior. This Comment’s argument for a 
narrower intent requirement, and the statutory language in Part III.B, is based on the expressed interest 
of the state in protecting against the sexual abuse of a child, not mere sexual arousal. However, in certain 
situations, the intent to trigger the sexual arousal of a child may be harmful on its own, and thus an adult 
intending to exploit a child by arousing the child would itself be offensive. If states have the broader goal 
of wanting to protect against that kind of behavior, a more expansive intent requirement may be 
appropriate. For example, in order to effectively criminalize the intent to arouse a child, the statute may 
also be properly rewritten to prohibit “an intent to arouse the sexual desire of the child for the purpose of 
exploitation” instead of “an intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person” as the Minnesota statute was 
written. 
 119 See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Freedom to think 
is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings 
of the mind.”); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937) (“[F]reedom [of thought] . . . is the 
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”). 
 120 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969). 
 121 See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The First 
Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that 
demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of 
identity.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[F]reedom to 
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental 
principle of the American government.”); Eugene Volokh, Texas Court Strikes Down Ban on 
Communications to Minors “That Relate[] to or Describe[] Sexual Conduct” Made with “Intent to 
[Sexually] Arouse”, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 30, 2013, 6:39 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2013/10/30/texas-court-strikes-ban-communications-minors-relate-describe-sexual-
conduct-made-intent-sexually-arouse [https://perma.cc/58PG-5ME8] (“First Amendment freedoms are 
most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible 
end.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 122 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). Without the freedom of thought, the 
freedom of speech is meaningless because one can only communicate what they think. See Freedom of 
Thought & The First Amendment, CTR. FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY & ETHICS, 
http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/issues/first_amend_index.html [https://perma.cc/GSJ7-7BM7]. As a 
result, by criminalizing the thoughts in one’s head, you are also threatening one’s First Amendment rights. 
See id. 
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thoughts in his head, however “salacious,” “murderous,” or 
“discriminatory,” are his own and the law may only intervene when he acts 
upon his thoughts.123 Therefore, this statute unconstitutionally prohibits both 
protected speech and thought. 
Critics might suggest that this analysis would make it impossible to 
draft a grooming statute and that the “intent to arouse” language provides a 
narrow enough range of speech under the statute. However, as explained 
below, the statute can be easily revised to criminalize speech communicated 
with an intent to engage a child in an illegal act by simply altering the intent 
requirement. 
B. How to Draft a Grooming Law in Line with the First Amendment 
This Section suggests a model grooming statute based on two other 
jurisdictions that have faced parallel issues. Legislatures in Texas124 and 
Oregon125 faced similar challenges to their grooming laws and courts in both 
states struck down their statutes under the overbreadth analysis.126 After 
striking down the statutes, Texas127 and Oregon128 then amended their laws 
to provide narrower constructions to ensure the statutes’ constitutionality. 
To avoid lengthy litigation and a constitutional challenge, states should 
avoid using the language that will fail strict scrutiny and may be construed 
by courts as overbroad. State legislatures should avoid using the “intent to 
arouse” requirement and should replace it with the “intent to engage in sexual 
conduct with the child.” Using the Minnesota statute as an example, the 
language of the statute could be amended as follows: 
  
 
 123 Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (striking down a Texas grooming law 
because it violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment). 
 124 See id. The statute in question in Ex parte Lo contains language nearly identical to that found in 
Minnesota’s grooming law. See id. at 17 n.23. 
 125 Powell’s Books, Inc. v. Kroger, 622 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (striking down OR. REV. 
STAT. § 167.057 (2015) as overbroad). 
 126 See supra note 39. 
 127 After the ruling in Ex parte Lo, the Texas legislature amended Texas Penal Code § 33.021 to 
remove the overbroad “intent to arouse” language and replaced it with the “intent to commit an offense 
listed in Article 62.001(5)(A), (B), or (K), Code of Criminal Procedure.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 33.021(b) (West 2015) (emphasis added). Articles 62.001(5)(A), (B), and (K) refer to a broad range of 
criminal sexual acts with a minor. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.00 (West 2017). 
 128 After the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Powell’s Books, the Oregon legislature subsequently amended 
§ 167.057 to remove the overbroad language “for the purpose of arousing and satisfying the sexual desires 
of the person” and replaced it with “for the purpose of inducing the minor or purported minor to engage 
in sexual conduct.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.057 (West 2016) (emphasis added). 
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Subd. 2a. Electronic solicitation of children. A person 18 years of age or 
older who uses the Internet, a computer, computer program, computer network, 
computer system, an electronic communications system, or a 
telecommunications, wire, or radio communications system, or other electronic 
device capable of electronic data storage or transmission to commit any of the 
following acts, with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person with the 
intent to engage in sexual conduct with the child, is guilty of a felony and may 
be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4: . . . 
(2) engaging in communication with a child or someone the person 
reasonably believes is a child, relating to or describing sexual conduct. 
By eliminating the “intent to arouse” language, and by requiring that an 
individual act with an intent to engage the child in sexual conduct, the law 
proscribes the intention to prey on a minor, instead of merely the sexual 
thoughts inside an individual’s head. States interested in enacting grooming 
legislation should therefore look to this amended statute for guidance.129 
C. Grooming Speech Should Be Classified as Unprotected Solicitation 
Speech 
When done effectively, grooming poses a greater danger and threat to 
children than does mere solicitation. The analysis below explains how 
grooming speech fits under the First Amendment’s solicitation doctrine. 
By narrowing the statute and only criminalizing speech communicated 
with an intent to engage in sexual conduct, grooming speech is more easily 
classifiable as “integral to criminal conduct” because it is part of the 
solicitation process.130 Sexual abuse through grooming is a “process” and 
more than a single “act” because grooming the child requires the adult to 
alter the way a child thinks by building dependence, forming an emotional 
 
 129 Repetitive behavior that causes harm over time, like constantly desensitizing a child to 
pornography, can be considered similar to other pattern offenses such as stalking and harassment. To 
prosecute these types of offenses, the state must show a “course of conduct,” which means a pattern of 
conduct comprised of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, that evidences a continuity of 
purpose. See “Pattern of Conduct” Examples, U. N.M. JUD. EDUC. CTR., http://jec.unm.edu/
education/online-training/stalking-tutorial/pattern-of-conduct-examples [https://perma.cc/DW2J-G8CD] 
(stating that while one verbally abusive phone call might be emotionally jarring, that alone may not be 
the basis of a criminal harassment prosecution; at some point after two or three calls, a pattern starts to 
emerge). Although not present in the model statute, and beyond the scope of this Comment, states may 
consider adding this “course of conduct” language to provide a narrower version of the statute. 
 130 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal transactions 
are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 
(1982) (stating that solicitation, as “an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange for private profit,” may 
be prohibited). 
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connection, and gaining the child’s trust to prevent resistance.131 When a 
sexual predator grooms a child for a sexual act, he goes through many steps 
to desensitize the child to sexually explicit images and conduct.132 As a result 
of the child’s dependence, sexual grooming poses a heightened risk of the 
predator successfully abusing the child.133 For example, consider a predator 
that solicits a sexual act from a child he has never met. Now, consider a 
predator that builds a child’s trust and respect for months, and then solicits 
the child for a sexual act. It is more likely that the predator will be successful 
in the second scenario, because the child thinks he or she is safe and trusts 
the adult.134 Because the grooming increased the likelihood of the predator’s 
success and contributed to the horrible result of a child’s abuse, the grooming 
should be considered part of the solicitation. Grooming, in other words, can 
be thought of as a drawn-out solicitation process—when sexual grooming 
begins, the intention to exploit the child begins. By classifying grooming 
speech as solicitation, therefore, a court or a legislature would not be 
expanding the scope of unprotected speech. Instead, it would be classifying 
certain types of speech as solicitation because they are dangerously integral 
to the solicitation process. 
This classification would therefore allow legislatures to pass grooming 
laws regulating this type of communication while not expanding the First 
Amendment doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
In Minnesota v. Muccio, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to 
recognize that the Minnesota grooming statute is a content-based law that 
does not pass strict scrutiny. The court overlooked that the statute is 
overbroad, and that it criminalizes sexual thoughts by criminalizing 
communication with an “intent to arouse.” The court should instead have 
struck down the statute and compelled the legislature to amend it. States that 
plan to enact grooming statutes should avoid potential constitutional 
challenges by drafting legislation that is narrowly tailored to achieve the 
compelling interest of protecting minors from sexual abuse. If properly 
drafted, grooming statutes should be upheld under the “integral to criminal 
conduct” exception because grooming should be considered an extended 
 
 131 Brief of Amicus Curiae, Minn. Coal. Against Sexual Assault at 13, Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d 149 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (No. A15-1951), 2016 WL 3924135. 
 132 See supra note 16. 
 133 See supra notes 16–18; Cory Jewell Jensen, Patti Bailey & Steve Jensen, Selection, Engagement 
and Seduction of Children and Adults by Child Molesters, 36 PROSECUTOR 3, 42–43 (2002) (describing 
the advanced techniques child molesters use to prey on children). 
 134  See supra notes 16–18. 
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solicitation process. The passage of narrowly tailored grooming laws will 
provide better protection for children, while also providing protection for the 
freedom of speech and thought––all of great importance. 
